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QUESTION PRESENTED 
This brief addresses the following question: 
Whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 
431 U.S. 209 (1977), should be overruled, and public 
sector agency shop arrangements invalidated, under 
the First Amendment.  
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1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 Amici curiae are the professors listed in 
Appendix A, each of whom has expertise relevant to 
the issues before the Court in this case. Amici are 
interested in the outcome of this case because it 
raises important questions about the extent of this 
Court’s traditional deference to states acting as 
employers; specifically, whether one time-tested 
method of public workforce management—collective 
bargaining with an elected union that represents 
members and non-members alike and is in turn 
supported by an agency fee—will be held 
unconstitutional. 
A list of signatories can be found at Appendix A, 
with institutional affiliations provided for 
identification purposes only. 
  
                                                 
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended 
to fund the preparation of this brief.  No person other than the 
amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to 
the preparation or submission of this brief.  Letters evidencing 
the parties’ consent to the filing of amicus briefs are on file with 
the clerk. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As employers that must manage large and 
diverse workforces and deliver critical public 
services, states and municipalities require 
substantial deference to their managerial choices. In 
addition, federalism principles weigh in favor of 
federal courts’ deference to state employers. Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), is 
simply one manifestation of these longstanding 
principles. 
I. Most public employers manage at least 
some of their employees by allowing them to elect a 
union representative to bargain collectively over 
terms and conditions of employment. Many of these 
employers also permit elected unions to charge a 
representation or “agency” fee from each worker to 
whom the union owes a duty of fair representation. 
The agency fee ensures that the union has the 
resources necessary to perform core tasks related to 
representation; without it, workers may engage in 
economically rational “free riding,” which can 
increase fractiousness among employees, damage 
morale, and leave unions unable to perform key 
functions. 
Collective bargaining has proven benefits for 
public employers—including preventing strikes and 
other labor disruptions, and improving the delivery 
of public services—because it provides a productive 
channel for workers to be heard and to resolve their 
differences with management. Thus, it is not 
surprising that a few public employers began 
bargaining with their employees’ chosen union 
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representatives even before they were required to by 
law. Later, public sector labor relations law caught 
up with practice as states sought to prevent public 
employee strikes, and to recruit and retain high-
quality employees. Indeed, empirical evidence shows 
fewer strikes where public employers have a duty to 
bargain with employees’ elected union 
representatives. In addition, collective bargaining is 
linked to a host of related workplace benefits, 
including reduced employee turnover, increased job 
satisfaction, and improved worker productivity. 
These benefits run to both employers and employees, 
and they explain how collective bargaining can raise 
worker pay without contributing significantly to 
increased public budgets.  
Many states have also concluded that unions 
are better able to perform their roles where they 
have adequate funds, and are funded in a fair way. A 
mandatory agency fee achieves both of these goals by 
requiring each represented worker to contribute to 
the costs of core union representational activities.  
Basic economics predicts that free riding is 
inevitable where workers receive the benefits of 
union representation whether or not they contribute 
toward its costs. And research shows both that free 
riding is common where workers are not required to 
pay an agency fee, and that it has a deleterious effect 
on unions’ abilities to represent workers. These 
negative effects will redound to public employers, as 
under-resourced unions are less likely to achieve the 
stability- and productivity-enhancing benefits 
described above. 
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II. This Court’s First Amendment case law 
has consistently afforded public employers the 
flexibility to manage their employees to best deliver 
public services. In particular, this Court has long 
permitted governments acting in their managerial 
capacities (rather than as sovereign) significant 
leeway to limit employees’ speech in the interest of 
workplace efficiency. Moreover, that is true even 
when the employee speech at issue is on a matter of 
public concern, and even when it takes place outside 
of working hours. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 
(2014), is not to the contrary, because that case did 
not involve public employees; by definition, the 
government could not have been acting in its public 
employer capacity. 
In light of that longstanding principle, the key 
inquiry in this case should be whether governments 
adopt agency fee policies in their employer 
capacities. Given the workforce management 
benefits of collective bargaining described above, it is 
plain that they do. Accordingly, Abood is consistent 
with this Court’s general approach to public 
employees’ First Amendment rights and should not 
be overturned.  
ARGUMENT 
States and localities bear responsibility for 
providing critical government services, including law 
enforcement, education, sanitation, and fire and 
disaster protection.  See Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 575 
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (those services 
“epitomize the concerns of local, democratic self-
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government”); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local 
governments.”).  These duties are carried out by 
public workers and managed by public officials.  
Control over how to manage this critical 
relationship is at the heart of this case. Petitioners 
ask this Court to remove from public employers one 
proven method of managing their workforces: 
collective bargaining with an elected union, whose 
core functions are funded through mandatory agency 
fees. Their argument is inconsistent with this 
Court’s longstanding practice of deferring to public 
employers when they act in their managerial 
capacity to ensure the efficient delivery of public 
services, including limiting public employees’ speech 
and association.  
I. Many States Improve Their Delivery of 
Public Services Through Collective 
Bargaining With Elected Unions That Are In 
Turn Supported By Agency Fees. 
Most states have chosen to manage their 
public employees in part by allowing them to bargain 
collectively over terms and conditions of 
employment. These states and municipalities have 
reasonably concluded that collective bargaining is a 
sensible and fair way to respond to employees’ 
concerns and desires, and this conclusion is 
supported by research showing that public sector 
bargaining tends to reduce strikes and improve the 
delivery of public services.  
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In addition, states may decide whether or not 
to permit unions to charge represented workers an 
agency fee, and many states have concluded that the 
benefits of collective bargaining are best achieved 
when each represented employee contributes to his 
or her union’s core representation expenses. In short, 
agency fees are an equitable way of ensuring that 
elected union representatives have the funding they 
need to represent every member of the bargaining 
unit. The alternative risks a situation in which too 
many employees make the economically rational 
decision to “free ride” while still receiving the 
benefits of union representation, leaving the union 
unable to effectively represent the workers who 
elected it. This outcome could lead to labor unrest 
and the loss of the public benefits that employers can 
achieve through collective bargaining. 
This Section first explains the benefits to 
states of public sector collective bargaining, and then 
addresses the role that agency fees play in achieving 
those goals. 
A. Collective Bargaining is a Time-Tested 
Method of Managing Public Workforces, 
Avoiding Workplace Disruption, and 
Improving Delivery of Public Services. 
In addition to making substantive human 
resources decisions about whom to hire or fire or how 
much to pay, state and local governments must 
decide how to manage the large numbers of workers 
they employ.  Unlike private employers, however, 
our federalist structure also allows states to dictate 
the laws that govern their internal labor-
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management relationships. States frequently 
exercise this freedom in light of their evolving views 
of how to achieve the best outcomes, with most 
states allowing at least some public employees to 
bargain collectively. Joseph Slater, The Strangely 
Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past 
Thirty Years, 30 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 511, 512-
13 (2013) (noting that as of 2007, all but seven states 
had some provision for public sector bargaining). 
Accordingly, states’ public sector labor relations 
regimes reflect a range of decisions on issues such as 
which employees (if any) may elect a bargaining 
representative, how to resolve bargaining impasses, 
whether (and which) public employees may strike, 
how to process employee grievances, and which 
working conditions are subject to bargaining.  See id. 
at 512-13; Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the 
Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Labor 
Law Spectrum, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 735 
(2009) (comparing Virginia, which has outlawed 
public sector collective bargaining, with Illinois, 
which has adopted robust collective bargaining).  
Whereas some of petitioners’ amici suggest 
that public sector collective bargaining is harmful to 
the public interest, and attribute its existence to 
misaligned political incentives, 2  both history and 
empirical research demonstrate important employer 
and public benefits of public sector collective 
                                                 
2 E.g., Br. Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found., et al., at 9-13. 
In contrast to the picture painted by some of petitioners’ amici, 
employee organizations (and later unions) have served as an 
“important wedge between political party machines and public 
employees.” William Herbert, Card Check Labor Certification: 
Lessons From New York, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 93, 101 (2010-11). 
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bargaining. First, states’ experiences over the last 
several decades show the value of collective 
bargaining in delivering public services; indeed, 
many public employers began bargaining with 
employee unions in order to ensure efficient and 
uninterrupted service even before they adopted state 
laws to facilitate bargaining. Second, research 
confirms that collective bargaining effectively 
resolves differences between employees and 
management, helping minimize potential discord 
and disruption, and decreasing the likelihood of 
strikes. Third, collective bargaining improves 
workers’ longevity and productivity, and yields other 
positive employment and service-delivery outcomes. 
Fourth, collective bargaining does not drain the 
public fisc; while workers represented by public 
sector unions tend to receive higher pay than their 
non-union counterparts, those pay increases are 
offset by other efficiencies. 
1. The utility of public sector bargaining for 
public employers is illustrated by its use long before 
the first state public-sector bargaining statute was 
passed in 1959. Joseph Slater, Public Workers:  
Government Employee Unions, the Law, and The 
State, 1900-62 158 (2004). Beginning in the early 
1900s, postal clerks, teachers, firefighters, and other 
public sector workers began to unionize, such that 
the number of unionized public sector workers 
nearly doubled from 1915 to 1921, and overall union 
density in the public sector increased from 4.8 
percent to 7.2 percent. Id. at 18.  
Some public employers responded by 
bargaining with labor unions, and the resulting 
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agreements took various forms—some were written, 
others were oral, and still others were written 
policies that were officially unilateral statements by 
the employer but in fact were forged with union 
input. For example, in 1934, Operating Engineers 
Local 142 negotiated a written agreement with the 
Chicago Board of Education that the Board followed. 
Id. at 124. The next year, the New York Emergency 
Relief Bureau “negotiated a grievance procedure 
with its unionized employees.” The result was signed 
by both sides, but later “changed to a unilateral 
announcement” after city officials “questioned the 
legality of a bilateral agreement.” Id. Federal 
entities negotiated with employees as well, notably 
in the Tennessee Valley Authority (written 
agreements that were formally unilateral but were 
produced through negotiation) and the U.S. Post 
Office (oral agreements that the Post Office 
followed). Id. 
By the late 1950s, increasing acceptance of 
public sector unions, and the growing disparity 
between law and practice, led states and the federal 
government to begin to authorize public-sector 
bargaining. Id. at 158-59, 190. By 1966, sixteen 
states had enacted laws granting at least some 
organizing and bargaining right to public employees, 
and by the end of the 1970s, a majority of states had 
adopted such laws. Id. at 191; Seth Harris, Joseph 
Slater, Anne Lofaso & David Gregory, Modern Labor 
Law in the Private and Public Sectors: Cases and 
Materials 63 (2013). 
Legislative materials associated with many 
early public sector collective bargaining laws reveal 
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that these laws were aimed at achieving multiple 
public goals, including stemming a tide of public 
employee strikes in the 1960s and 1970s, 3  and 
recruiting and retaining high-quality employees who 
would efficiently deliver public services. See, e.g., 
Michigan Panel Report on Public Employee 
Bargaining (Feb. 28, 1967) (describing “basic 
objective[]” of “protecting the general public against 
interruptions or impairment of essential government 
services”); Pennsylvania Governor’s Commission to 
Revise the Public Employment Law 7 (1968) (absence 
of collective bargaining rights “reduces the value of 
[government employment] to that employe [sic]”); 
Rhode Island’s Commission to Study Mediation and 
Arbitration 2 (1966) (“To achieve high quality 
education, good relations between teaching 
personnel and school boards are indispensable.”); 
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Public 
Employee Labor Relations 2 (1969) (“the employee’s 
efficiency and contribution to the service generally 
increases if he participates in the decisions”); New 
York, Governor’s Committee on Public Employee 
Relations Final Report 9 (1966) (“protection of the 
public from strikes in public services requires the 
designation of other ways and means for dealing 
with claims of public employees for equitable 
treatment”). 
2. Consistent with these states’ early findings, 
research shows that collective bargaining provides a 
productive channel for employees to resolve 
                                                 
3  US Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work 
Stoppages in Government, 1979 4 (1981), available at 
http://bit.ly/1laOKzG. 
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differences with their public employers without 
resorting to strikes or other disruptive conflict. By 
facilitating employees’ input into the terms and 
conditions of their work, union representation—
including contract negotiation, grievance processes, 
and impasse procedures—prevents or mitigates 
employee dissatisfaction before it reaches a 
disruptive level. Moreover, the creation of structured 
channels for communication can help management 
and employees to understand each other’s 
perspectives and enable ongoing, low-level problem 
solving. 
Accordingly, one study of state and local 
government workers over a fifteen-year period found 
that “[s]trike incidence is highest when the parties 
have neither a duty to bargain nor dispute-
resolution procedures.” Janet Currie & Sheena 
McConnell, The Impact of Collective-Bargaining 
Legislation on Disputes in the U.S. Public Sector: No 
Legislation May Be the Worst Legislation, 37 J.L. & 
Econ. 519, 532 (1994). Numerous other researchers 
confirm this conclusion.4 The Currie & McConnell 
study also concluded that “[s]trike incidence can be 
                                                 
4 E.g., James L. Stern & Craig Olson, The Propensity to Strike 
of Public Employees, 11 J. Collective Negotiations 201 (1982); 
David Lewin et al., Getting It Right: Empirical Evidence and 
Policy Implications from Research on Public-Sector Unionism 
and Collective Bargaining 2, 13–14 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792942; Martin H. Malin, Public 
Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. Mich. 
J.L. Ref. 313, 361-65 (1993) (finding significantly fewer public 
sector strikes occurred in Ohio and Illinois after those states 
passed collective bargaining statutes); Richard C. Kearney & 
Patrice M. Mareschal, Labor Relations in the Public Sector 247-
48 (5th ed. 2014) (reviewing studies). 
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reduced by switching to a regime in which employers 
are required to bargain in good faith and strikes are 
illegal.” Id. at 544.  
Given its effectiveness in reducing conflict, it 
is unsurprising that most states and localities have 
adopted collective bargaining for at least some 
employees. Even states that generally eschew public 
sector bargaining sometimes permit union 
representation and collective bargaining for public 
safety employees, where service interruptions due to 
strikes would be singularly costly or dangerous. 
Thus, nearly all states permit bargaining by 
professional firefighters, including some that 
authorize no or nearly no other bargaining. Richard 
Kearney, Labor Relations in the Public Sector 62-64 
(4th ed. 2009); see also Malin, Public Employees’ 
Right to Strike, at 316 n.13 (listing states that 
permit collective bargaining only within certain 
employee units, including first responders). More 
starkly, when Wisconsin’s legislature significantly 
curtailed collective bargaining for most public sector 
workers, it left intact bargaining rights (including 
permitting agency fees) for public safety workers, 
citing the dangers of strikes by those workers.5 Wisc. 
Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856, 
865 (W.D. Wisc. 2012), rev’d in part, 705 F.3d 640 
(7th Cir. 2013); see also Casey Ichniowski, Collective 
Bargaining & Compulsory Arbitration: Prescriptions 
for the Blue Flu, 21 Indus. Rel. 149 (1982) (finding 
that “municipalities in states that provide for 
                                                 
5 Subsequently, Wisconsin barred agency fees in the private 
sector, Wis. Stat., § 111.04(3) (2015), but that legislation did 
not affect the legality of agency fees for public safety unions. 
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collective bargaining in any form experience 
significantly fewer police strikes than do 
municipalities in environments where there is no 
law or where police bargaining is specifically 
outlawed”). 
3. In addition to averting workplace 
disruption, collective bargaining yields affirmative 
benefits for public employers, including improved 
workplace efficiency and reduced employee turnover. 
A large body of evidence shows that collective 
bargaining benefits employers in two key ways. 
First, the chance to have a voice at work through 
collective bargaining is itself highly valued by 
employees, who report that they view bargaining 
both as a way to improve their own lives and to 
make their employers more successful. Richard B. 
Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 4-5 
(1999). Second, workers who have a say in workplace 
decisions are “more likely to buy into the firm’s 
processes and objectives,” yielding higher “job 
satisfaction, loyalty, and job tenure” and “reduc[ing] 
the costs associated with the hiring and training of 
new employees and provides an incentive for 
investment in enterprise-specific skills.” Stephen F. 
Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal 
For An American Works Councils Act, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 
607, 611-12 (2004); see also Samuel Estreicher, “Easy 
In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace 
Representation, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1615, 1620 (2014) 
(“collective bargaining provides a means for workers 
to collectively express their preference for [a 
particular workplace policy] and for parties to 
determine whether the collective benefits outweigh 
the collective costs of its provision”); Kenneth G. 
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Dau-Schmidt & Arthur R. Traynor, Regulating 
Unions and Collective Bargaining, in Labor and 
Employment Law and Economics 96, 109 (Kenneth 
G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2009) (collective 
bargaining helps employees to feel more useful and 
engaged, and has been linked to productivity gains, 
including lower turnover, search, and retraining 
costs). 
Empirical studies find that where mature 
collective bargaining relationships develop, “unions 
can increase firm productivity in certain industries, 
particularly if management constructively embraces, 
rather than fights, union contributions.”  Dau-
Schmidt & Traynor at 109-10; see also Richard B. 
Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 
19 (1985) (“unions are associated with greater 
efficiency in most settings”). Other research suggests 
that this finding also holds in the public sector. For 
example, one study linked teachers unions to 
stronger statewide performance on standardized 
college entrance exams. Robert Carini, Brian Powell 
& Lala Carr Steelman, Do Teacher Unions Hinder 
Educational Performance? Lessons Learned From 
State SAT & ACT Scores, 70 Harv. Educ. Rev. 437 
(2000). Other studies have reached similar findings.6  
                                                 
6  F. Howard Nelson, Michael Rosen & Brian Powell, Are 
Teachers’ Unions Hurting American Education? A State-By-
State Analysis Of The Impact Of Collective Bargaining Among 
Teachers on Student Performance 4 (1996) (“The results of this 
study demonstrate clearly that student performance on [SAT 
College Entrance exams and the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress fourth grade reading test] is significantly 
better in states with high levels of unionization with all other 
variables held constant.”); Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L. 
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The explanation for these productivity gains 
in unionized school districts likely has many causes, 
but one is straightforward:  
[I]t would be silly to try to plan school 
policies or curricula without consulting 
with the teachers who have been 
trained to educate children and who are 
actually involved in the day-to-day 
                                                                                                    
Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers: 
Impact on Wages & Educational Output, in When Public Sector 
Workers Unionize 306 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey 
Ichniowski eds., 1988) (“collective bargaining coverage is 
associated with . . . higher educational performance as 
measured by student test scores and high graduation rates”); 
Randall W. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions & the 
Productivity of Public Schools, 40 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 354, 
354 (1987) (“[h]olding resources constant and using 
achievement gains on standardized tests as the measure of 
output, . . . union [school] districts are seven percent more 
productive for average students,” and three percent more 
productive across all students). To be sure, there is variation in 
the literature on the effect of teachers unions on school district 
productivity, which may be in part a function of which states 
are investigated. Compare Michael F. Lovenheim, Stanford 
Institute for Economic Policy Research, The Effect of Teachers’ 
Unions on Education Production: Evidence From Union 
Election Certifications in Three Midwestern States (March 
2009), http://bit.ly/1WVvGBn (“teachers’ unions have no impact 
on teacher pay or per-student district expenditures . . . class 
sizes. . . . [or] high school dropout rates”) with Benjamin A. 
Lindy, The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on 
Student Achievement: Evidence From a New Mexico Natural 
Experiment, 120 Yale L.J. 1130, 1169 (2011) (study of effect of 
teachers unions in New Mexico, finding that “mandatory 
collective bargaining laws in the public school context lead to 
an increase in SAT scores and a decrease in graduation rates”). 
This variation underscores the importance of permitting state 
experimentation with a range of workplace-relations models. 
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running of the schools. Discussions with 
collective representatives in a union 
setting are more likely to be productive 
than individual discussions because 
employees will have less fear of 
retaliation for reporting administrative 
failures. 
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Mohammad Khan, 
Undermining or Promoting Democratic 
Government?: An Economic and Empirical Analysis 
of the Two Views of Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining in American Labor Law, 14 Nev. L.J. 
414, 429 (2014) (productivity gains can be attributed 
to facts that “unions help promote the negotiation of 
efficient contract terms,” ensure that those terms are 
enforced, and facilitate worker voice, which lowers 
costly employee turnover). 
In addition to workforce management 
benefits, some states and municipalities have 
worked to achieve other public policy goals through 
collaborative labor-management relationships. For 
example, some school districts (including in 
California) have been remarkably successful in 
partnering with their employees’ collective 
bargaining representatives to improve student 
performance and teacher quality. Ken Futernick et 
al., Labor-Management Collaboration in Education: 
The Process, The Impact, & The Prospects For 
Change 25 (Janice L. Agee ed., 2013) (“[t]he most 
common practice in high-[labor-management 
cooperation] districts was a consistent, shared focus 
on the quality of education provided to the district’s 
students[,]” and citing examples including Green Dot 
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Public Schools in Los Angeles, where 
“administrators and union representatives explicitly 
prioritize student interests as they negotiate 
contracts”); Saul A. Rubinstein & John E. McCarthy, 
Collaborating on School Reform: Creating Union-
Management Partnerships to Improve Public School 
Systems 8-12 (2010) (describing case studies, 
including union-management collaboration within 
California’s ABC School District on topics including 
peer mentoring and evaluation, new teacher 
orientation, and use of data-based decision making 
on student performance); Bobbi C. Houtchens et al., 
Local Labor Management Relationships as a Vehicle 
to Advance Reform: Findings From the U.S. 
Department of Education Labor Management 
Conference, 4 (2011) (describing case studies in 
which labor-management partnerships have 
contributed to improved student outcomes in a range 
of areas by facilitating “teacher leadership,” which is 
“essential to dynamic decision-making”).  
Among these success stories are school 
districts such as Toledo, OH, where teachers unions 
have worked with districts to develop rigorous yet 
fair teacher evaluation and development systems, 
thereby improving teacher buy-in to what is often a 
tremendously divisive issue. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
Shared Responsibility: A U.S. Department of 
Education White Paper on Labor-Management 
Collaboration 11-12 (2012) (describing union-
management Board of Review in Ohio, which has 
“provide[d] more rigorous evaluations than those 
conducted by principals in the past”). Similarly, in 
Massachusetts, “interest based” rather than 
adversarial collective bargaining resulted in both 
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school and union leadership becoming more likely to 
view collective bargaining as a “vehicle[] for 
improving student performance,” and also facilitated 
a collaborative process that resulted in improved 
teacher leadership, dual language immersion 
education, improved professional development, and 
other improvements at districts serving large 
numbers of low-income, minority, and special 
education students. Thomas A. Kochan et al., 
Massachusetts Education Partnership: Results & 
Research From the First Two Years (2015).  
Similar examples abound, and are not limited 
to education. In Ohio, labor-management 
cooperation led to “millions of dollars in savings” 
across state government, with former Governor 
George Voinovich observing that “[m]y feeling is that 
labor is key” to successful quality management 
efforts. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Report of the U.S. 
Secretary of Labor’s Task Force on Excellence in 
State & Local Government Through Labor-
Management Cooperation (1996), available at 
http://1.usa.gov/1klt2bG. In Massachusetts, a joint 
venture between labor unions and MassHighway 
resulted in a sixty percent reduction in workers 
compensation claims, significant reductions in 
overtime and sick time, and millions in savings. Id., 
available at http://1.usa.gov/1ix3J5e. Significantly, 
in each of these examples, as in the public education 
examples described in the previous paragraph, the 
collective representative played a key role in 
marshaling employee support for the joint initiative, 
on one hand, and channeling employee feedback, on 
the other. Given the importance of employee buy-in 
to the success of these new initiatives, each would 
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have been more difficult in an employment setting 
that lacked employee representation. 
4. Finally, public sector bargaining has been 
shown to have little effect on overall budgets; even 
within program budgets, the effects of bargaining on 
allocation are generally modest and offset by 
efficiency gains. “The research on public 
expenditures . . . confirms that there are few if any 
public shifts in expenditures attributable to 
collective bargaining.” Jeffrey H. Keefe, A 
Reconsideration and Empirical Evaluation of 
Wellington’s & Winter’s, The Unions And the Cities, 
34 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 251, 272-73 (2013) 
(citing studies). Further, while public sector 
collective bargaining “has resulted in higher public 
employee wages in the range of 5% to 8%” over 
wages in states without bargaining, id. at 272, 
several caveats apply. First, bargaining can help 
offset employer monopsony power in the public 
sector, mitigating the wage penalty many public 
sector employees experience relative to comparable 
private sector employees. Id. 7  Second, wage 
increases may be offset by productivity gains, as 
described above. Third, the lowest-skilled (and 
lowest paid) public sector workers tend to receive the 
                                                 
7 Public employer monopsony power can depress public sector 
workers’ wages, especially for highly skilled or professional 
employees. Joseph Slater & Elijah Welenc, Are Public-Sector 
Employees “Overpaid” Relative to Private-Sector Employees? An 
Overview of the Studies, 52 Washburn L.J. 533, 534 (2013) 
(stating that “a majority of studies have found that public 
workers overall are paid somewhat less than comparable 
private-sector employees,” though workers at the bottom of the 
pay scale are somewhat better off in the public sector, and 
workers at the top of the pay scale are worse off).  
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greatest wage increases associated with 
unionization; as many states turn their attention to 
the problem of income inequality, raising the wages 
of these workers may reflect public policy choices as 
much as union pressure. Lewin, Getting it Right at 6 
(“[m]ore highly educated employees . . . enjoy less of 
a union premium than their less educated 
counterparts, which also contributes to lower [] 
income inequality and helps to keep the overall costs 
of collective bargaining to employers in check”).  
 In the public sector, labor relations are not 
simply a matter of employee choice. Rather, states 
have shaped their collective bargaining laws and 
policies to facilitate effective employee relations.  
B. Mandatory Agency Fees Are a Fair Way 
to Ensure Unions Have the Resources 
Necessary Carry Out Their Statutory 
Mandates and to Achieve the Public 
Benefits of Collective Bargaining. 
There are two primary (and related) reasons 
that states that have adopted collective bargaining 
as a method of workforce management may choose to 
require or permit agency fees. First, agency fees 
distribute the costs of representation equally among 
all who are represented by an elected union; and 
second, agency fees ensure unions have sufficient 
resources for states to achieve the benefits of 
collective bargaining.  
1. Virtually all states and municipalities that 
bargain collectively with their employees do so only 
with elected unions that represent all of the 
employees in a bargaining unit, and agency fees are 
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a fair way of distributing the costs of that 
representation. As in the private sector, public sector 
employers nearly always operate on the “exclusive 
representation” model, which is substantially more 
straightforward than alternatives such as 
bargaining with multiple employee representatives. 
Only three states have even experimented with 
proportional union representation, and two of 
them—including California 8 —rapidly abandoned 
that initiative.9 Martin H. Malin, Ann C. Hodges & 
Joseph E. Slater, Public Sector Employment: Cases 
and Materials 340 (2d ed. 2011). 
Moreover, when acting as an exclusive 
representative, a labor union has a duty to represent 
all employees within the bargaining unit fairly. 
Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 
(1944) (“It is a principle of general application that 
the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of 
others involves the assumption toward them of a 
duty to exercise the power in their interest and 
behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be 
                                                 
8 Cal. Gov’t Code § 3540 (1976) (known as the Educational 
Employment Relations Act). Petitioners argue that California 
education unions can “choose between being a ‘members only’ 
union that advances only members’ interests, or an exclusive 
representative that represents all employees.” Pet. Br. 38 
(citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 3543.1(a)). That is incorrect, because 
California law imposes a bargaining obligation “only with 
representatives of employee organizations selected as exclusive 
representatives” of bargaining units. Cal. Gov’t Code  § 3543.3 
(1976). 
9 The third, Tennessee, adopted a system in 2011 that permits 
any representative chosen by at least fifteen percent of teachers 
to participate in “collaborative conferencing” with school 
districts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-605 (2011). 
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deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for 
whom it is exercised unless so expressed.”); Lehnert 
v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our First Amendment 
jurisprudence therefore recognizes a correlation 
between the rights and the duties of the union, on 
the one hand, and the nonunion members of the 
bargaining unit, on the other.”). 
Given the union’s responsibilities, the 
economic consequences of eliminating the agency 
fee—the free rider problem—are easy to predict. In 
short, even an employee who desires union 
representation would rationally decide not to pay a 
voluntary representation fee when the benefits of 
union representation—including individualized 
benefits like grievance representation—cannot be 
withheld from non-payers.  See Mancur Olson, The 
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the 
Theory of Groups 88, 124 (1971) (“A rational worker 
will not voluntarily contribute to a (large) union 
providing a collective benefit since he alone would 
not perceptibly strengthen the union, and since he 
would get the benefits of any union achievements 
whether or not he supported the union.”); Richard A. 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 430 (8th ed. 2011) 
(“The representation election, the principle of 
exclusive representation, and the union shop 
together constitute an ingenious set of devices . . . for 
overcoming the free-rider problems that would 
otherwise plague the union  . . . .”).  This Court has 
previously acknowledged this economic reality.  See 
Harris, 134 S.Ct. at 2638 (“[T]he best argument that 
can be mounted in support of Abood is based on the 
fact that a union, in serving as the exclusive 
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representative of all the employees in a bargaining 
unit, is required by law to engage in certain 
activities that benefit nonmembers and that the 
union would not undertake if it did not have a legal 
obligation to do so.”); Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22 (the 
“union-shop arrangement has been thought to 
distribute fairly the cost of these activities among 
those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive 
that employees might otherwise have to become free-
riders”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
footnote omitted).  
Research confirms the intuitive proposition 
that when services are available with or without 
payment, many will choose not to pay.10 Keefe, A 
Reconsideration & Empirical Evaluation, 34 Comp. 
Lab. L. & Pol’y J. at 258 (“[p]ublic sector open shop 
laws reduced average employee departmental 
unionization by 4.0% for fire services, 10% for 
highways, 12% for sanitation, and 15% for police” 
and describing research finding “union density is 
almost double where unions are allowed to negotiate 
agency shop union security provisions, using CPS 
data from 1983 to 2004.”); see also Jeffrey H. Keefe, 
On Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association: 
The Inextricable Links Between Exclusive 
Representation, Agency Fees, and the Duty of Fair 
Representation (2015), available at 
                                                 
10 Petitioners’ “solution” that unions should “simply redirect the 
massive amounts they . . . spend on express political advocacy” 
in order to fulfill their statutory mandate to represent 
nonmembers, Pet. Br. 31-32, raises its own First Amendment 
concerns, “[f]or the majority also has an interest in stating its 
views without being silenced by the dissenters.” Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961). 
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http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/94942.pdf; Barry T. 
Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership 
and Coverage Database from the Current Population 
Survey, 56 Indus. & Labor Relations Rev. 349, 349–
54 (2003). Likewise, when Michigan recently 
eliminated agency fees for union-represented public 
sector workers, union membership fell in the state 
even as the state’s public sector workforce grew. See 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Affiliation of Employed 
Wage & Salary Workers By State, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t05.htm; see 
also Keefe, Inextricable Links at 2-3. Perhaps some 
of these employees objected to union representation 
altogether; others surely decided not to subsidize 
their co-workers’ union representation—and instead 
to be subsidized by others. But these losses 
undermine states’ interests in equitable workforce 
policies and risk sowing dissent in the workplace. 
Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22 (recognizing the state 
interest in fairly distributing collective bargaining 
costs); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (discussing need for public 
employers to maintain workplace discipline, morale, 
workplace harmony, and efficiency). This is not to 
say that states may choose only bargaining 
supported by agency fees—of course that is not the 
case—but rather that states may now adopt or reject 
agency fees (or serially experiment with both 
models). Petitioners would remove that choice from 
states. 
2. Closely related, the representation with 
which elected unions are tasked is expensive; an 
under-resourced union will be less able to provide 
the benefits of public sector bargaining and may also 
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be unable to carry out its statutory duties. The 
employer-side benefits of public sector collective 
bargaining—such as providing a productive channel 
for employee voice by both negotiating and enforcing 
contracts via grievance proceedings, and working 
collaboratively with management to solve workplace 
problems—require trained union staff and other 
resources. For example, competent bargaining over 
even relatively straightforward wages and benefits 
for a group of public employees at various stages of 
their careers requires the services of compensation 
consultants, actuaries, and lawyers. Even processing 
a single grievance typically involves not just the 
costs of paying the union/employee representative 
who appears before the arbitrator, but also half of 
the arbitrator’s fee and expenses. William B. Gould 
IV, Kissing Cousins? The Federal Arbitration Act 
and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 Emory L.J. 609, 
675 (2006). 
As this Court has recognized, labor unrest 
may result if dissatisfaction with an under-resourced 
union leads employees to seek out a representative 
that is better able to perform its duties. See Perry 
Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assoc., 460 
U.S. 37, 52 (1983) (the “exclusion of the rival union 
may reasonably be considered a means of insuring 
labor-peace” by preventing the employer from 
“becoming a battlefield for inter-union squabbles”); 
Abood, 431 U.S. at 224 (discussing the “confusion 
and conflict that could arise if rival . . . unions, 
holding quite different views as to [terms and 
conditions of employment], each sought to obtain the 
employer’s agreement”). Moreover, when unions are 
at risk of losing funding from any employee 
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dissatisfied with any aspect of the representation, 
they may respond by concluding that they “must 
process every grievance, placate every member, fight 
for every little cause, in order to hold its 
membership.  The secure union, on the other hand, 
can tell off a member just as well and sometimes 
better than management can.” Md. Dep’t of Labor, 
Licensing and Regulation, Collective Bargaining for 
Maryland Public Employees: A Review of Policy 
Issues and Options 19 (1996). This dynamic may (or 
may not) be preferable to represented workers, but it 
would undoubtedly make it more difficult for states 
to achieve the benefits of collective bargaining 
described above. 
Thus, eliminating states’ choice to permit or 
require an agency fee would not only leave states 
vulnerable to intra-workforce conflict and 
resentment as some workers free-ride on others, but 
would also leave states less able to compete with the 
private sector for the best workers and respond to 
employee dissatisfaction through collective 
bargaining. Of course, the prospect of workplace 
disruption poses special concerns for public 
employers and administrators. It also presents a 
certain irony—as discussed above, the avoidance of 
labor disruption is one significant reason to allow 
public employees to bargain collectively. Yet if states 
lack the freedom to manage their employees by 
bargaining with an elected union with the financial 
means to robustly represent its members, they may 
lose the very benefits that led them to authorize 
collective bargaining in the first place.  
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II. This Court’s Cases Concerning the 
Managerial Rights of Public Employers 
Have Repeatedly Affirmed That Abood 
Struck the Appropriate First Amendment 
Balance. 
This Court has recognized in countless cases that 
governments acting in their managerial capacity 
have significantly more power to control workers’ 
speech than governments acting in their sovereign 
capacities have over non-employee citizens. That 
principle is especially forceful in the context of state 
and local governments, where federalism also weighs 
in favor of states’ managerial authority. See Kelley v. 
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (states’ 
managerial choices are entitled to “the same sort of 
presumption of legislative validity as are state 
choices designed to promote other aims within the 
cognizance of the State's police power”). The outcome 
in this case should be no different; indeed, it is the 
petitioners in this case who seek an anomalous 
departure from settled law. 
Given their responsibilities over core 
governmental functions, states and localities require 
significant autonomy in workforce management. For 
that reason, this Court has “often recognized that 
government has significantly greater leeway in its 
dealings with citizen employees than it does when it 
brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at 
large.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 
599 (2008); see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 
131 S. Ct. 2488, 2497 (2011) (“The government's 
interest in managing its internal affairs requires 
proper restraints on the invocation of rights by 
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employees when the workplace or the government 
employer's responsibilities may be affected.”); 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) 
(plurality opinion) (“The government as employer 
indeed has far broader powers than does the 
government as sovereign.”); United Pub. Workers of 
Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947) (“For 
regulation of employees it is not necessary that the 
act regulated be anything more than an act 
reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with 
the efficiency of the public service.”).  Accordingly, 
this Court has permitted public sector employers 
much of the same discretion over human resources 
management as enjoyed by the private sector. See 
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 152 (2011) (“Like any 
employer, the Government is entitled to have its 
projects staffed by reliable, law-abiding persons who 
will efficiently and effectively discharge their 
duties.” (internal quotations omitted)); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“[G]overnment 
offices could not function if every employment 
decision became a constitutional matter.”); U.S. 
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 
413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973) (holding Congress may bar 
public employees from engaging in certain political 
activity).   
Managing public sector labor relations by 
bargaining with an elected exclusive representative 
that is financially supported by agency fees is no 
different than the numerous other restrictions or 
requirements that government employees must 
accept. The balance struck in Abood recognized as 
much in holding public employees could be required 
to pay their share of union expenses related to 
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collective bargaining—that is, expenses attributable 
to the union’s dealing with the state in its capacity 
as employer—but not other activities, including 
those related to the union’s dealing with the state in 
its capacity as sovereign. 431 U.S. at 235-36. 
Subsequent cases, including Harris v. Quinn, have 
only reinforced that principle. 134 S. Ct. at 2642  
(“with respect to the [workers at issue], the State is 
not acting in a traditional employer role”).  
A. Abood is Consistent With This Court’s 
Longstanding Principle That Public 
Employers May Restrict Public 
Employees’ Speech to Promote the 
Efficiency of Government Operations.  
 The distinction between government-as-
employer and government-as-sovereign is critical in 
the First Amendment context. “If an employee does 
not speak as a citizen, or does not address a matter 
of public concern, a federal court is not the 
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of 
a personnel decision . . . . Even if an employee does 
speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the 
employee’s speech is not automatically privileged.” 
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2493 (internal quotations 
omitted). “Restraints are justified by the consensual 
nature of the employment relationship and by the 
unique nature of the government’s interest.” Id. at 
2493. 
 Accordingly, this Court has permitted 
significant limits on public employees’ speech and 
association, provided they are reasonably linked to 
the government employer’s managerial interests. 
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That principle explains why government may 
prohibit public employees’ core political speech even 
when they are off-duty. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99-100 
(“If . . . efficiency may be best obtained by 
prohibiting active participation by classified 
employees in politics as party officers or workers, we 
see no constitutional objection.”); see also Nat’l Ass’n 
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565 (holding that 
Hatch Act limits on public employees’ participation 
in political campaigns are constitutional because 
they “will reduce the hazards to fair and effective 
government”). Mitchell and its progeny also 
illustrate that this Court typically defers to 
government employers’ determinations about what 
employment policies will promote the efficient 
provision of public services. 330 U.S. at 100 
(government employer need not prove that political 
neutrality is “indispensible”); see also Kelley, 425 
U.S. at 247 (regulation of law enforcement personnel 
is entitled to deference, unless “there is no rational 
connection between the regulation, based as it is on 
the county's method of organizing its police force, 
and the promotion of safety of persons and 
property”); Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 697 n.5 
(1973) (stating that “the legislature must have some 
leeway” in implementing restrictions on employees’ 
partisan political activities).11 
                                                 
11 The dispositive significance of the government-as-employer’s 
interests in maintaining organizational efficiency is further 
illustrated by this Court’s decisions concerning the role of 
political considerations in employment decisions. On one hand, 
this Court has rejected political patronage systems for most 
employees because the interests that support political 
patronage for non-policymaking employees “are not interests 
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This Court has applied the same principle in 
countless other cases involving limits on public 
employee speech, upholding limits that are 
reasonably connected to the public employer’s 
interests in managing its workforce, and rejecting 
those that are not. E.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1988) (public school teacher 
could not be punished for speaking as a citizen 
where speech did not “impede[] the teacher’s 
performance of his daily duties” . . . or “interfere[] 
with the regular operation of the schools generally”); 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 
513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (prohibition on 
compensation for public employees’ outside speeches 
or writing is unconstitutional where employees’ 
speech occurred in “their capacity as citizens,” and 
“does not even arguably have any adverse impact on 
the efficiency of the offices in which they work”); 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“A 
government entity has broader discretion to restrict 
speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the 
restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech 
that has some potential to affect the entity's 
operations.”); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 
388 (1987) (“[T]he state interest element of the 
[Pickering] test focuses on the effective functioning 
                                                                                                    
that the government has in its capacity as an employer.” Rutan 
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 70 n.4 & 75 (1990). 
However, the Court also noted that patronage may be 
permissible where “‘party affiliation is an appropriate 
requirement for the effective performance of the public office 
involved.’” Id. at 71 n.5 (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 
518 (1980)). It is the presence of legitimate managerial 
concerns that makes the difference to the First Amendment 
outcome. 
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of the public employer’s enterprise.”). Harris v. 
Quinn is simply the latest iteration of this principle; 
there, this Court’s holding rested largely on its 
conclusion that Illinois did not employ the personal 
assistants who opposed payment of a mandatory 
agency fee, 134 S.Ct. at 2638, and therefore by 
definition was not entitled to the deference usually 
afforded to public employers.  
Thus, a key inquiry in this case is whether 
California’s adoption of collective bargaining 
supported by an agency fee is reasonably related to 
its interest in managing its workforce. And, as the 
previous section illustrates, states adopt systems of 
collective bargaining with elected unions that may 
charge agency fees for the management-related goals 
of improving operational efficiency and minimizing 
workforce conflict and disruption. Likewise, when an 
elected union sits across the bargaining table from a 
public employer or pursues a grievance, it acts as an 
agent for one or more public employees regarding 
their terms and conditions of employment in a 
manner that quintessentially involves government-
as-employer rather than government-as-sovereign. 
This is perhaps most readily apparent in the context 
of grievance proceedings where a union argues on 
behalf of a single employee that a single contract 
term has been misapplied. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2496 (allowing close First Amendment scrutiny of 
“grievances on a variety of employment matters” . . . 
“would raise serious federalism and separation-of-
powers concerns”). But negotiation over terms and 
conditions of employment for a bargaining unit as a 
whole is no different. As Justice Scalia pointed out 
during oral argument in Harris v. Quinn, there is no 
  
 
33
meaningful difference between an individual public 
employee asking for a raise on behalf of all public 
employees (perhaps because the employee is aware 
that civil service protections limit the authority of 
the employer to give a single employee a raise) and a 
union seeking a raise on behalf of all employees in a 
bargaining unit. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8 
(No. 11-681) (“it’s the same grievance if the union 
had presented it . . . the grievance is the salaries for 
policemen are not high enough.”). Moreover, many 
collectively bargained terms and conditions of 
employment concern prosaic issues that may be of 
significant importance to public employees, but are 
of little public importance. For example, petitioners 
cite “seniority preferences” as a “hotly debated” 
policy issue about which some unions bargain, Pet. 
Br. at 26, but this Court has already held that 
internal decisions about when or how to transfer 
public employees are generally not a matter of public 
concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.12 In all of those 
                                                 
12  Likewise, the application of contract terms in individual 
cases in which unions represent an employee in a grievance 
proceeding would be exceedingly unlikely to raise an issue of 
public concern. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2501 (public employees 
may not “transform everyday employment disputes into 
matters for constitutional litigation in the federal courts”); see 
also William B. Gould IV, Organized Labor, The Supreme 
Court, & Harris v. Quinn: Déjà vu All Over Again?, 2014 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 133, 158-59. And even as to wages and benefits, the 
effect of collective bargaining on the size of public budgets is 
often small, supra Part I.A.4, and therefore should not 
implicate the Harris majority’s concern about the effects of 
collective bargaining on overall program budgets. Cf. Harris, 
134 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (reasoning that collective bargaining over 
Medicaid-funded home healthcare providers would qualify as a 
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examples, the government acts as an employer 
managing its employees; accordingly, deference to 
states’ managerial choices about when—and under 
what terms—collective bargaining supported by an 
agency fee should be permitted is appropriate under 
this Court’s case law.   
Finally, the distinction between government’s 
roles as public employer and as sovereign (and the 
mirror-image distinction between individuals’ roles 
as employees and citizens) also explains why this 
Court should reject petitioners’ argument that 
collective bargaining is essentially the same as 
lobbying, Pet. Br. at 12. The key difference is that 
bargaining takes place with a government in its 
employer capacity, but lobbying involves a 
government in its capacity as sovereign. Compare 
Minn. St. Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 
U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (public employer may bargain 
with exclusive representative only, and exclude all 
others, because bargaining did not take place in 
public forum and “[n]othing in the First Amendment 
. . . require[s] government policymakers to listen or 
respond to individuals’ communications on public 
issues”), with City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 
v. Wisc. Empl. Rel. Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) 
(public employer may not prohibit union-represented 
teachers from engaging in speech contrary to union 
position in public forum). 13  This distinction also 
                                                                                                    
matter of public concern because it “would almost certainly 
mean increased expenditures under the Medicaid program”).  
13 As City of Madison illustrates, represented workers remain 
free to oppose their bargaining representative by any available 
means and in any forum to which they can gain access; indeed, 
the average union wage premium leaves represented workers 
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explains why states may prohibit public sector 
collective bargaining altogether without facing First 
Amendment scrutiny. Smith v. Ark. State Highway 
Emp., 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (“the First 
Amendment is not a substitute for the national labor 
relations laws”). In contrast, it goes nearly without 
saying that the same could not be said of a statute 
that banned lobbying. See U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 
612 (1954); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“Congress has no power to 
ban lobbying itself.”).  
B. Overruling Abood Would Call Into 
Question the Legality of Many Other 
Common Public Human Resources 
Practices. 
 If this Court holds that public employees have 
a right not to fund union activities related to 
collective bargaining, many other common workplace 
arrangements will also be called into question. For 
example, many state pension funds are managed by 
and invested in private companies; the corporations 
in which public pension plans invest may engage in 
political speech, raising Abood-type issues. See 
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and 
Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 
Colum. L. Rev. 800, 867-68 (2012). Similar claims 
                                                                                                    
with more resources with which to oppose union positions in 
public fora or lobby for revocation of public sector bargaining 
statutes. Thus, the restriction on public employees in this case 
is much less than Mitchell’s complete ban on certain political 
activity, or the party affiliation requirements that the Court 
suggested in Rutan and Branti would be permissible for policy-
making employees. 
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could be made regarding state payments to human 
resources consultants, employment lawyers, and 
dispute resolution experts who are paid by the state 
to manage the workplace. See Cynthia Estlund, Are 
Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 
169, 171 (2015) (describing “a larger category of 
private entities with public regulatory functions”). 
These routine public workplace policies should not 
become subject to First Amendment challenges. 
This Court should not overrule Abood, but 
should instead reaffirm that states are free to 
manage their workforces by adopting a policy of 
public sector bargaining supported by an agency fee. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Ninth Circuit should be affirmed. 
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